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Improving Regulatory
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Lessons from the Past and
Prospects for the Future
Susan E. Dudley†
Abstract
This Article examines efforts by the three branches of federal
government to oversee regulatory policy and procedures. It begins with
a review of efforts over the last century to establish appropriate checks
and balances on regulations issued by the executive branch and then
evaluates current regulatory reforms that would hold the executive
branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch more
accountable for regulations and their outcomes.
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Introduction
In the more than 125 years since Congress created the first
regulatory body,1 the number of regulatory agencies and the scope and
reach of the regulations they issue has increased significantly. In 2014,
there were more than seventy federal agencies, employing almost
300,000 people to write and implement regulation.2 Every year federal
agencies issue tens of thousands of new regulations,3 which now occupy
more than 175,000 pages of regulatory code. 4 For over a century,
concerns over the accountability of what some have called the “fourth
branch of government” have led all three branches of government to
take steps to exercise checks and balances on the development and
enforcement of regulations.5
This Article examines efforts by the three branches of federal government to oversee regulatory policy and procedures. It begins with a
review of efforts over the last century to establish appropriate checks
and balances on regulations issued by the executive branch and then
evaluates current regulatory reforms that would hold the executive
branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch more accountable for regulations and their outcomes.

1.

The Interstate Commerce Act established the Interstate Commerce
Commission in 1887 to regulate railroad rates. Interstate Commerce Act,
ch. 104, 24 Stat. 445 (1887).

2.

Susan Dudley & Melinda Warren, Economic Forms of Regulation on the Rise: An Analysis of the U.S. Budget for Fiscal
Years 2014 and 2015, at 2, 7 (2014), available at http://regulatory
studies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/fi
les/downloads/2015_Regulators_Budget.pdf. Note that “[a]gencies that
primarily perform taxation, entitlement, procurement, subsidy, and credit
functions are excluded from this report,” so these figures exclude staff
developing and administering regulations in the Internal Revenue Service,
the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, etc. Id. at 14.

3.

Office of the Federal Register, Federal Register Pages Published 1936–2013 (2014).

4.

Office of the Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations
Page Breakdown: 1975 through 2013 (2014).

5.

See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245,
2253–69 (2001) (outlining nonpresidential mechanisms of controlling
agencies and presidential administration of agencies generally).
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I. Evolution of Executive Discretion Regarding
Regulatory Policy and Practice in the United States
We begin with a review of the evolution of regulatory policy in the
United States, from the establishment of the first regulatory agencies
in the late nineteenth century, to the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) of 1946,6 to the economic deregulation of the
1970s and ’80s, to the growth in health, safety, and environmental
regulations since then, which has led to increased emphasis on executive
branch oversight, congressional reforms, and judicial review.
A.

Early Regulatory Agencies and the
Delegation of Legislative Authority

Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
the first regulatory agency, in 1887 to regulate railroad rates.7 The ICC
was an independent, bipartisan commission of seven members, which
reached decisions through an adjudicatory approach. Over the next
several decades, this model served as the basis for subsequent regulatory
commissions, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (1914),
the Water Power Commission (1920) (later the Federal Power
Commission), and the Federal Radio Commission (1927) (later the
Federal Communications Commission (or FCC)); Congress also created
other agencies to regulate commercial and financial systems, including
the Federal Reserve Board (1913), the Tariff Commission (1916), the
Packers and Stockyards Administration (1916), and the Commodities
Exchange Authority (1922).8 Most of these early agencies were established as independent regulatory commissions outside executive departments 9 and were structured to be more independent of presidential
control.10 Their members could only be dismissed for good cause (“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”) 11 in contrast to
political appointees in executive departments, who serve “at the
pleasure of the president”12 and can be fired for any reason.

6.

5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012).

7.

Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 445 (1887).

8.

Office of Management and Budget, Report to Congress on the
Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (1997) [hereinafter
OMB 1997].

9.

For example, the Packers and Stockyards Administration was established
within the Department of Agriculture. Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921,
7 U.S.C. § 181 (2012).

10.

Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency
Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 615–19 (2010).

11.

Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623 (1935).

12.

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 190 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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During this period, courts interpreted the separation of powers
implicit in Articles I–III of the U.S. Constitution as prohibiting the
delegation of legislative powers to the executive. Early cases held that
limited delegation was permissible as long as the executive branch was
merely “fill[ing] up the details.” 13 “That Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized
as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution.”14
By 1928, however, the Supreme Court softened its strict interpretation of the nondelegation doctrine in a decision that found that a
congressional delegation of power was constitutional because the statute included an “intelligible principle” to guide executive action.15
In the 1930s, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal
brought an increase in the number of government regulatory agencies,
including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (1931), the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (1932), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (1933), the Commodity Credit Corporation (1933),
the Farm Credit Administration (1933), the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) (1934), and the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) (1935).16 The jurisdiction of other agencies, including the ICC,
the FCC, and the FDA, expanded during this period.17 The Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 18 created a new agency, now called the
Employment Standards Administration, in the Department of Labor
(DOL).19
The sweeping powers of these new regulatory agencies led to
concerns over the constitutionality of congressional delegation to a
“fourth branch” of government.20 In 1935, the Supreme Court weighed

13.

Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).

14.

Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).

15.

J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).

16.

OMB 1997, supra note 8.

17.

Id.

18.

Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201–219 (2012)).

19.

OMB 1997, supra note 8.

20.

Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent
Regulatory Process, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 461, 485–86 (1994) (quoting
Robert E. Cushman, The Problem of the Independent
Regulatory Commissions, reprinted in, The President’s Committee
on Administrative Management, Report of the Committee with
Studies of Administrative Management in the Federal
Government 205–43 (1937)).
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in with a ruling that the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)21
was unconstitutional because it provided the President (and private
industry associations) “virtually unfettered” decision-making power.22
B.

Procedural Reform and the Administrative Procedure Act

Concern that agency “power was not sufficiently safeguarded and
sometimes was put to arbitrary and biased use”23 led both Congress and
the Executive Branch to conduct extensive reviews of agency conduct.24
Years of debate culminated in the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) in 1946.
According to one researcher, the APA reflected a “fierce compromise”:
The battle over the APA helped to resolve the conflict between
bureaucratic efficiency and the rule of law, and permitted the
continued growth of government regulation. The APA expressed
the nation’s decision to permit extensive government, but to
avoid dictatorship and central planning.25

The APA established procedures an agency must follow to promulgate
binding rules and regulations within the area delegated to it by statute.
As long as executive branch agencies act within the rulemaking
authority delegated to them by Congress, and follow the procedures in
the APA, recent courts have not found it unconstitutional for them to
write and enforce regulations.26

21.

Pub. L. 73–67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

22.

A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42
(1935).

23.

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37 (1950) (citing Elihu Root,
Public Service by the Bar, 39 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 355, 368 (1916)); Charles
E. Hughes, Some Aspects of the Development of American Law, 39 Proc.
of the Ann. Meeting of the N.Y.B.A. 266, 269 (1916); George
Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, 40 Ann. Rep.
A.B.A. 197, 205 (1917); President Guthrie, Judicial Powers by
Administrative Boards and the Creation of Administrative Courts, 46
Proc. of the Ann. Meeting of the N.Y.B.A. 169, 186 (1923).

24.

E.g., APA at 65: Is Reform Needed to Create Jobs, Promote Economic
Growth, and Reduce Costs? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 25–27 (2011) (statement of Jeffery A. Rosen, Kirkland & Ellis LLP)
[hereinafter Is Reform Needed].

25.

George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1559
(1996).

26.

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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While some constitutional scholars still debate the question of
delegation,27 recent Supreme Court cases have not overturned legislation or regulation on nondelegation grounds. In 1989, the Supreme
Court opined:
In our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing
and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.28

Congress has supplemented the APA through legislation tailored to
specific programs and passed government-wide procedural laws (e.g.,
the Freedom of Information Act of 1966,29 and the Government in the
Sunshine Act of 1976 30 ). 31 However, the APA has guided executive
branch rulemaking without significant amendment for more than sixtyfive years and is one of the most important pieces of legislation ever
enacted.32
C.

Removal of Economic Regulation

The regulatory agencies formed during the New Deal and earlier
generally issued “economic regulations.” That is, they regulated a broad
array of activities within particular industries using economic controls
such as price ceilings or floors, quantity restrictions, and service
parameters. 33 Economic regulation is often justified by concerns of
“market power” or “natural monopoly”—where a market can be served
at lowest cost with a single supplier.34

27.

E.g., David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My
Critics, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 731 (1999); Paul Craig Roberts, How the
Law Was Lost, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 853 (1999).

28.

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that agency rulemaking
authority is legislative power).

29.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).

30.

Id. § 552(b).

31.

See Jeffrey Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking
(5th ed. 2012) (discussing generally the creation of programs to
supplement the APA).

32.

Is Reform Needed, supra note 24.

33.

See Murray L. Weidenbaum, Business and Government in the
Global Marketplace 23–41 (6th ed. 1999) (discussing the development
and rationale of U.S. regulation).

34.

See W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon & Joseph E. Harrington Jr.,
Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 356–57 (Mass. Inst. Tech.
4th ed. 2005) (1992) (discussing the regulation of natural monopolies).
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Though established as independent commissions to avoid political
influence,35 observers began to be concerned that these agencies were
“captured” by the industries they regulated. By the early 1970s,
scholarship in the fields of economics, antitrust, and law generally
supported the idea that regulation of private sector prices, entry, and
exit tended to keep prices higher than necessary, to the benefit of
regulated industries, and at the expense of consumers.36 Policy entrepreneurs in the Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administrations, in Congress,
and at think tanks were able to link this knowledge to the problem of
inflation by showing that eliminating economic regulations and
fostering competition would lead to reduced prices.37 Bipartisan efforts
across all three branches of government eventually led to the abolition
of whole agencies such as the Civil Aeronautics Board and the ICC,
and removal of unnecessary regulation in several previously regulated
industries, with resulting improvements in innovation and consumer
welfare.38
The transportation and telecommunications deregulation that took
place in the 1970s and 1980s is generally regarded as a success, having
lowered consumer prices and increased choices. Deregulation and
consumer choice have aligned service quality with customer preferences.
Competitive markets have generated real gains—and not just
reallocated benefits—for consumers and society as a whole, and markets
have evolved in beneficial ways that were not anticipated before
deregulation.39
D.

Growth in Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation

At the same time that economic forms of regulation were declining,
a new type of regulation began to emerge, aimed at protecting
consumers, environmental quality, and workplace safety. Many of these
new regulatory agencies were established as part of the executive
branch, either in departments, such as the newly formed Department

35.

See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935) (noting
that Congress created the Federal Trade Commission as an independent
agency because “it was essential that the commission should not be open
to the suspicion of partisan direction”).

36.

George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ.
& Mgmt. Sci. 3, 3 (1971).

37.

Susan E. Dudley, Alfred Kahn 1917–2010, Regulation, Spring 2011, at 8.

38.

Martha Derthick & Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation 5 (1985); ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–88, § 101,
109 Stat. 803, 804 (1995).

39.

Clifford Winston, U.S. Industry Adjustment to Economic Deregulation,
12 J. Econ. Persp., 89, 89–90, 97 (1998).
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of Transportation (DOT) (1967),40 or as standalone agencies, such as
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1970). 41 Unlike the
economic regulatory agencies created earlier, these new agencies had
the power to regulate across industry boundaries and affect industrial
processes, product designs, and by-products.42
Safety regulatory agencies established within the DOT included the
Federal Highway Administration (established in 1966 to set highway
and truck safety standards), the Federal Railroad Administration
(established in 1966 to issue rail safety standards), and the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (established in 1970 to set passenger vehicle standards).43
Congress expanded the newly created EPA’s authorities through
the Clean Air Act (1970), the Clean Water Act (1972), the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), the Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976).44
Congress also created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (1970) as part of DOL and expanded mine safety and health
regulation.45 Other labor-related regulations were authorized through
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the Pension and
Welfare Administration, “established in 1974 to administer and
regulate pension plan insurance systems.”46 During the same period,
Congress established several independent regulatory agencies, including
the National Credit Union Administration (1970), the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (1972), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1973), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (1977).47
E.

Executive Controls on Regulation

Concerns over the burden of these new regulations and other reporting requirements led President Carter (building on efforts of Presidents Nixon and Ford before him) to create procedures for analyzing

40.

Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)).

41.

David M. Bearden et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL 30798, Environmental
Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by the Environmental
Protection Agency 1 (2013).

42.

See WEIDENBAUM, supra note 33 (comparing the “old method” of
regulations, which were more industry specific, with the “new method” of
regulations, where agencies have broader jurisdiction).

43.

OMB 1997, supra note 8.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.
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the impact of new regulations and minimizing their burdens.48 They
also led to the passage of two significant pieces of legislation in 1980.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)49 required agencies to analyze
the impact of their regulatory actions on small entities and consider
effective alternatives that minimize small entity impacts. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 198050 established the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) to review and approve all new reporting requirements
with an eye toward minimizing burdens associated with the
government’s collection of information.
When President Reagan took office in 1981, he continued to pare
back economic regulations, and through Executive Order 12,291,51 he
gave the newly created OIRA a role in reviewing draft regulations to
ensure their benefits exceeded their costs. Executive Order 12,498,52
issued in 1985, established a Regulatory Program of the most significant
upcoming regulations, published annually to “improve the management
of regulatory activity within the Executive branch” and “provide the
public and the Congress with a greater opportunity to learn about and
evaluate . . . regulatory priorities and procedures.”53 Each subsequent
president has continued and expanded OIRA’s central regulatory
oversight role,54 if not its budget.55
President George H.W. Bush continued to operate under President
Reagan’s executive orders, and when President Clinton took office in
1993, he replaced them with E.O. 12,866, 56 which remains in effect
today. E.O. 12,866 retained OIRA’s review of significant new

48.

President Carter’s E.O. 12,044 required agency heads to determine the
need for a regulation, evaluate the direct and indirect effects of alternatives, and choose the least burdensome. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R.
152 (1979).

49.

Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) [hereinafter Regulatory
Flexibility Act].

50.

Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980).

51.

Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).

52.

Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986).

53.

Message to the Congress on the Regulatory Program of the United States
Government, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1066 (Aug. 7, 1986).

54.

Susan E. Dudley, Observations on OIRA’s Thirtieth Anniversary, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 114–15, 127 (2011).

55.

See Kathryn Vesey, OIRA Celebrates 30th Anniversary, The George
Wash. Univ. Reg. Studies Ctr. (June 28, 2011), https://regulatory
studies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/fi
les/downloads/20110628_oira_staffing.pdf (describing the budgetary and
staffing constraints of OIRA).

56.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
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regulations57 and reinforced the philosophy that regulations should be
based on an analysis of the costs and benefits of all available alternatives and that agencies should select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits to society unless otherwise constrained by law.58 President George W. Bush and President Obama have continued these
policies and procedures. President Obama’s recent reforms are discussed
in the next section. In addition, over the last three decades, OIRA has
issued several bulletins and memoranda elaborating on these executive
orders, including OMB Circular A-4 providing agency guidance on
preparing regulatory impact analysis, 59 bulletins articulating good
practices for guidance documents,60 data quality,61 and peer review,62
principles for risk analysis, 63 and others. 64 The table below lists the
executive orders that have guided regulatory development and
presidential oversight since 1978.

57.

Executive Order 12,866 limited OIRA review to “significant” regulations
but provides the OIRA with some room to determine what falls into that
definition. Id. at 644–48.

58.

See id. at 638–39 (stating the regulatory philosophy and principles that
federal agencies should keep in mind when promulgating regulations).

59.

Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB
Circular No. A-4, Regulatory Analysis (2003).

60.

Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432,
3440 (Jan. 25, 2007).

61.

Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility,
and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed.
Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002).

62.

Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB
MEMO NO. M-05-03, Issuance of OMB’s “Final Information
Quality Bulletin for Peer Review” (2004).

63.

Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB
Memo No. M-07-24, Updated Principles for Risk Analysis (2007).

64.

OIRA’s website provides links to guidance for regulatory departments and
agencies when developing and reviewing regulations. OIRA–For Agencies,
Office
of
Mgmt.
&
Budget,
http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/inforeg_regpol_agency_review/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).

1036

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 4·2015
Improving Regulatory Accountability

Executive Orders on Regulatory Analysis and Oversight65
Executive
Date
Title
Administration
Order
Signed
“Improving Government
March 23,
EO 12,04466
Regulations”
Carter
1978
(revoked by EO 12,291)
“Paperwork”
November
EO 12,17467
Carter
(revoked by EO 12,291)
30, 1979
“Federal
Regulation”
February
17,
EO 12,29168
Reagan
(revoked by EO 12,866)
1981
“Regulatory Planning
January 4,
EO 12,49869
Process”
Reagan
1985
(revoked by EO 12,866)
“Regulatory Planning
September
EO 12,86670
and Review”
Clinton
30, 1993
(amended by EO 13,258)
“Amending Executive Order
12866 on Regulatory
February 26,
EO 13,25871
G.W. Bush
Planning and Review”
2002
(revoked by EO 13,497)
“Further Amendment to
Executive Order 12866 on
January 18,
EO 13,42272
G.W. Bush
Regulatory Planning
2007
and Review”
(revoked by EO 13,497)
“Revocation of Certain
Executive Orders
January 30,
EO 13,49773
Obama
Concerning Regulatory
2009
Planning and Review”

65.

Regulation 101, George Wash. Univ. Reg. Studies Ctr., http://reg
ulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/regulation-101#ExecutiveOrders (last
visited Apr. 11, 2015).

66.

Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979).

67.

Exec. Order No. 12,174, 3 C.F.R. 462 (1980).

68.

Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127(1982).

69.

Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986).

70.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).

71.

Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003).

72.

Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008).

73.

Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010).
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EO 13,56374
EO 13,57975
EO 13,61076

“Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review”
“Regulation and
Independent Regulatory
Agencies”
“Identifying and Reducing
Regulatory Burdens”

Obama

January 18,
2011

Obama

July 11, 2011

Obama

May 10,
2012

While these executive branch efforts have done little to slow the
growth in new regulation,77 they have focused attention on understanding the effects of regulations, and some argue they have resulted in
“smarter regulation” that produces more benefits than costs.78
F.

Congressional Efforts at Regulatory Reform

Political scientists agree that Congress has “an ‘awesome arsenal’
of weapons” 79 to control agencies’ actions, including “legislation,
appropriations, hearings, investigations, personal interventions, and
‘friendly advice’ that is ignored at an executive’s peril.”80 James Q.
Wilson used an analogy to explain the two main ways Congress
exercises control over federal agencies. One is through authorizing
legislation, which he characterized as “architectural; the life of an
agency is constrained by its need to live within a certain space, move
along prescribed corridors, and operate specified appliances.” 81 The
74.

Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012).

75.

Exec. Order No. 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012).

76.

Exec. Order No. 13,610, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2013).

77.

The GW Regulatory Studies Center maintains various statistics on regulatory activity, including pages of regulatory code, on-budget costs and
personnel at regulatory agencies, numbers of regulations, etc. Reg Stats,
GEORGE WASH. UNIV. REG. STUDIES CTR., http://regulatorystudies.
columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).

78.

See, e.g., John D. Graham, Paul R. Noe & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing
the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33
Fordham Urb. L.J. 953 (2006) (explaining how President George W.
Bush’s administration used a “smart regulation” approach that evaluated
regulations using multiple disciplines); Cass Sunstein, Smarter
Regulation: Remarks from Cass Sunstein, Administrator, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 7 (2011) (describing President Obama’s approach to federal regulation and the purpose of the regulatory system).

79.

James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy 236 (1989) (citing Herbert Kaufman,
The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs 164
(1981)).

80.

Id.

81.

Id.
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other is like “fire fighting; when an alarm goes off signaling that an
agency may be violating some congressional interest, members of Congress rush in to put out the fire.”82 Until the Supreme Court struck the
legislative veto down in 1983,83 Congress used its architectural powers
to insert legislative veto provisions in more than two hundred statutes,
allowing one or both houses or their relevant committees to disapprove,
without the President’s signature, an agency’s exercise of delegated
authority.84
Despite these powers, the legislative branch has been less active
than the executive branch in exerting concerted oversight over the
regulatory process.85 In 1995, a Republican majority took control of
both houses of Congress, having run on a platform that included
regulatory reform. By this time, the social regulations (addressing
health, safety, and environmental issues) that had begun in the 1970s
were the focus of concern. In contrast to the consensus on economic
regulations, academics and policy makers did not generally support
outright deregulation, but rather reforms to make regulations less burdensome and more cost-beneficial.
The 104th Congress announced an ambitious agenda that included
efforts to codify regulatory impact analysis procedures similar to those
required through executive order, to require compensation for
regulatory actions that reduced the value of property rights, to cap the
costs of new regulations through a regulatory budget, and to give
Congress more control and accountability over the content of new
regulations.86
These efforts at comprehensive regulatory reform legislation in the
104th Congress failed to win a majority of votes, but some targeted
efforts became law, including these:
 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995,87 which
required executive branch agencies to estimate and try to
minimize burdens on state, local, and tribal governments, and
private entities,

82.

Id.

83.

See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that the congressional
veto provision in Immigration and Nationality Act is unconstitutional).

84.

Wilson, supra note 79, at 243.

85.

Kagan, supra note 5, at 2257 (noting that Congress used its veto powers
rarely).

86.

Susan E. Dudley, Administrative Law & Regulation: Prospects for Regulatory Reform in 2011, 12 Engage 7, 7 (2011).

87.

Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).
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 The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) of 1996,88 which reinforced RFA requirements for
small business impact analyses and provided for judicial review
of agencies’ determinations as to whether regulations would
have “a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities,”89
 The Congressional Review Act (CRA) of 1996,90 contained in
SBREFA and passed in response to the loss of the legislative
veto, which required agencies to submit final regulations with
supporting documentation to both houses of Congress, and established expedited procedures by which Congress could overturn regulations within a specified time using a Joint Resolution of Disapproval,
 1995 Amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act,91 which
reauthorized OIRA and required further reductions in paperwork burdens, and
 Title VI, Section 645, of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997,92 which directed OMB to submit a report
to Congress estimating the costs and benefits of major regulations, and offer recommendations for reform. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 93 made permanent this
requirement for OMB to report to Congress annually.94

These efforts have had mixed results. Agencies generally meet
UMRA requirements with reference to regulatory impact analyses
prepared pursuant to Executive Order 12,866 but rarely do more.95

88.

Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).

89.

Id. at 865–66.

90.

Id. at 868–69.

91.

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163
(1995).

92.

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–366 (1996).

93.

Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

94.

Id. at 2763A–161. The 104th Congress also passed amendments to the
Safe Drinking Water Act, directing the Environmental Protection Agency
to set standards based on a balancing of costs and benefits. Safe Drinking
Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613
(1996).

95.

See Unfunded Mandates and Regulatory Overreach: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and
Procurement Reform of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
112th Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of Susan E. Dudley, George
Washington Univ. Reg. Studies Ctr.) [hereinafter Dudley, Unfunded
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While pursuant to SBREFA, courts have overturned regulations that
fail to consider impacts on small business,96 agencies have successfully
defended regulations that ignore the RFA requirements if the regulation’s effects on small entities are considered to be “indirect.”97
“Congress has used the CRA to enact a resolution of disapproval
only once, overturning an OSHA regulation addressing ergonomics in
the workplace.” 98 Though resolutions of disapproval require only a
simple majority in Congress (and several have passed one house), they
face the threat of presidential veto, which would require a two-thirds
majority to override. The conditions surrounding the ergonomics regulation were likely key to its disapproval. It was a “midnight regulation,”
issued amid much controversy at the end of the Clinton Administration.
The resolution disapproving the rule came at the beginning of the Bush
Administration (which did not support the rule), eliminating the veto
threat. Although it has only nullified one action using the CRA,
Congress has introduced dozens of resolutions of disapproval,99 and in
some instances, the threat of passage of a resolution of disapproval may
have compelled agencies to modify regulatory actions.100

Mandates] (discussing the shortcomings of UMRA for its limited coverage
of regulations and inadequate requirement for agency analysis).
96.

See Nw. Mining Ass’n v. Babbitt, 5 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1998) (recognizing private business’ rights to be informed when their interests are at
stake by government regulations and to participate in the regulatory
process); S. Offshore Fishing Ass’n v. Daley, 995 F. Supp. 1411 (M.D.
Fla. 1998) (striking down a fishery management plan for failing to consider economic effects on small businesses required by RFA).

97.

American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1043–45 (D.C. Cir.
1999); see also Jeffrey J. Polich, Judicial Review and the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act: An Early Examination of When
and Where Judges Are Using Their Newly Granted Power over Federal
Regulatory Agencies, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1425, 1449 (2000) (discussing cases where the regulations were upheld by courts).

98.

APA at 65: Is Reform Needed to Create Jobs, Promote Economic Growth,
and Reduce Costs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial
and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 14 (2011)
(statement of Susan E. Dudley, George Wash. Univ. Reg. Studies Ctr.);
see also Richard S. Beth, Cong. Research Serv., RL31160,
Disapproval of Regulations by Congress: Procedure Under the
Congressional Review Act 9 (2001) (giving the details on both the
Senate’s and the House’s disproval of the rule submitted by OSHA).

99.

Congressional Review Act FAQs, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
http://www.gao.gov/legal/congressact/cra_faq.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2015).

100. Steven J. Balla, Legislative Organization and Congressional Review of
Agency Regulations, 16 J.L. Econ. & Org. 424, 429 (2000).
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Pursuant to the Regulatory Right to Know Act,101 OMB does report annually to Congress on the costs and benefits of major regulations,102 but a 2001 Congressional Research Service report observed that
OMB’s reports “have been incomplete, and its benefits estimates have
been questioned.” 103 The General Accounting Office 104 and others 105
have noted that it is difficult for OMB to report objectively on
estimates of regulatory benefits and costs.

II. Executive Branch Oversight of Regulation
A.

President Obama’s Initiatives

Like presidents before him, President Obama has reinforced and
expanded the principles and practices of regulatory analysis and executive oversight. He retained OIRA, and its staff of fewer than fifty
career civil servants who operate within the Executive Office of the
President, reviewing regulations to ensure they are consistent with the
President’s priorities, and coordinating interagency review to avoid
redundancy and conflict.106 With its mission to ensure that regulations’
benefits justify their costs, OIRA plays an important role. It is
institutionally more interested in impacts on society broadly and less
susceptible to special interest pressures than line agencies,107 and provides what President Obama has called “a dispassionate and analytical
‘second opinion’ on agency actions.”108

101. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 624, 114 Stat. 2763A-161 (2000). 31 U.S.C. § 1105,
Annual Statement and Report on Rules and Regulations (2012).
102. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, OIRA Reports to Congress, The
White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_regpol_repor
ts_congress/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
103. Rogelio Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., IB95035, Federal Regulatory Reform: An Overview 11 (2001).
104. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO/GGD-99-59, Regulatory Accounting: Analysis of OMB’s Reports on the Costs and
Benefits of Federal Regulation 56 (1999) [hereinafter GAO,
Analysis of OMB’s Reports].
105. Susan E. Dudley, Perpetuating Puffery: An Analysis of the Composition
of OMB’s Reported Benefits of Regulation, 47 Bus. Econ. 165, 175 (2012).
106. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, About OIRA, The White House,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_administrator (last visited Feb. 7,
2015).
107. Susan E. Dudley, Regulatory Reform: Lessons Learned, Challenges
Ahead, Regulation, Summer 2009, at 6.
108. Memorandum on Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 (Feb. 3, 2009).
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On January 18, 2011, the President published an op-ed in the Wall
Street Journal109 outlining his approach to regulation and issued a new
executive order. Executive Order 13,563 on “Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review” reaffirmed the principles and practices that have
been in effect since 1981.110 It reinforced President Clinton’s Executive
Order 12,866 and stressed the importance of conducting sound analysis
of likely regulatory impacts, of providing public opportunities to engage
in the process of developing new regulations, and of designing less
burdensome, more flexible approaches to achieve regulatory goals. It
also required agencies to develop plans for periodically reviewing
regulations already on the books, with an eye toward streamlining,
repealing, or expanding them to make them more effective and less
burdensome.
President Obama ventured further than previous presidents in
issuing E.O. 13,579 in July 2011, encouraging independent regulatory
agencies to comply with E.O. 13,563 requirements “concerning public
participation, integration and innovation, flexible approaches, and
science,” to the extent permitted by law. 111 E.O. 13,579 also said that
these “agencies should consider how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or
excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal
them in accordance with what has been learned,” and make such
information public.112
E.O. 13,610, issued in May 2012, focused on “Identifying and
Reducing Regulatory Burdens.” 113 It directed agencies to engage the
public in their retrospective review of existing regulations, prioritize
reviews that would produce significant quantifiable savings, and report
regularly to OIRA on the progress of their initiatives.114
B.

113th Congress Proposals for Executive Branch Controls

The 113th Congress considered various regulatory reform proposals
designed to give the executive branch more responsibility for ensuring

109. Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System,
Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 2011, at A17.
110. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The President’s
Regulatory Strategy, (Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/18/fact-sheet-presidents-regulatorystrategy.
111. Exec. Order No. 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012).
112. Id. at 257.
113. Exec. Order No. 13,610, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2013).
114. Id. at 259.
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new regulations meet procedural and analytical requirements.115 None
of these were enacted into law, but the concepts behind them may serve
as the foundation for future initiatives.
1.

Enhanced Regulatory Impact Analysis

Several bills focused on codifying requirements for regulatory
impact analysis of proposed regulations.116 As discussed above, presidents of both parties over the last thirty years have issued executive
orders articulating nearly identical regulatory analysis principles to
guide regulatory decisions, and at least since 1980, there have been
attempts to codify these executive requirements in statute.117
Though the creation of a statutory obligation for meeting these
regulatory impact analysis standards is probably not necessary to
ensure that future presidents continue to endorse them, codifying the
requirements could have several advantages. First, such legislation
would lend congressional support to the nonpartisan principles and the
philosophy that before issuing regulations agencies should identify a
compelling public need, evaluate the likely effects of alternative
regulatory approaches, and select the alternative that provides the
greatest net benefit to Americans.118 The Sound Regulation Act,119 and

115. See Reg. Studies Ctr., Regulatory Reform Bills, 113th Congress,
George Wash. U., http://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/regul
atory-reform-bills-113th-congress (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
116. See, e.g., Restoring Honesty for Our Economy Act, S. 786, 113th Cong.
(2013) (requiring “agencies to quantify costs associated with proposed
economically significant regulations”); Sound Regulation Act of 2014, S.
2099, 113th Cong. (2014) (placing more emphasis on the benefit-cost
analysis developed to support regulations).
117. 1980 Economic Report of the President 125 (1980) [hereinafter 1980
Economic Report].
118. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (“Federal agencies should
promulgate only such regulations as are required by law, are necessary to
interpret the law, or are made necessary by compelling public need, such
as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health
and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of the
American people. In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies
should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives,
including the alternative of not regulating. Costs and benefits shall be
understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent
that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs
and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to
consider. Further, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches,
agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety,
and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute
requires another regulatory approach.”).
119. H.R. 3863, 113th Cong. (2014).
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the Jumpstarting Opportunities with Bold Solutions Act120 would have
required federal agencies to identify “the nature and significance of the
market failure, regulatory failure, or other problem that necessitates
regulatory action and why other alternatives, such as market forces
or state or local regulations, could not address the problem better than
federal regulation,” 121 and “develop at least 3 distinct regulatory
options, in addition to not regulating, that the agency estimates will
provide the greatest benefits for the least cost in meeting the regulatory
objective,”122 among other analytical steps.
Second, legislation could apply these requirements to independent
agencies (which administrations have been reluctant to do through
executive order for fear of stirring up debate over the relationship
between independent agencies and the President). For example,
Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2013123 would allow
the president by executive order to subject independent regulatory
agencies to the executive analytical requirements applicable to other
agencies. Several bills also attempted to impose analytical requirements
on specific independent agencies, such as the FCC, 124 and the
independent financial regulatory agencies. 125 When gathered at the
OIRA 30th Anniversary conference hosted by the GW Regulatory
Studies Center and the Administrative Law Review, former OIRA
administrators of both parties agreed on the importance of engaging
independent regulatory agencies in regulatory analysis and oversight.126
Third, Congress could make compliance with them judicially reviewable.127
Additionally, some bills emphasize certain features that members
have found lacking in existing regulatory analysis requirements. For
example, the small business community has been frustrated that courts
have interpreted the RFA’s requirements to assess economic impact as
applying only to direct compliance costs. They argue that agencies
should consider reasonably foreseeable indirect economic impacts on
120. H.R. 4304, 113th Cong. (2014).
121. H.R. 3863 (CRS bill summary); H.R. 4304.
122. H.R. 3863 § 3(f)(1)(C).
123. S. 1173, 113th Cong. (2013).
124. Federal Communications Commission Process Reform Act of 2014, H.R.
3675, 113th Cong. (2014); FCC “ABCs” Act of 2013, H.R. 2649, 113th
Cong. (2013); Federal Communications Commission Process Reform Act
of 2014, S. 1989, 113th Cong. (2014).
125. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 1062, 113th Cong. (2013);
Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2013, S. 450, 113th Cong. (2013).
126. Symposium, OIRA Thirtieth Anniversary Conference, 63 Admin. L. Rev.
1, 6 (2011).
127. See discussion infra Part IV.
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small entities, such as increases in input prices (e.g., electricity, natural
gas, or transportation) or state-level regulations issued pursuant to
federal rules. This latter issue is particularly important for
environmental regulations, where the “duty of regulating is passed on
to the States . . . without any corresponding analysis or requirements
for States to consider less burdensome alternatives for small
business.” 128 The Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act 129 would
have amended the RFA to include “any indirect economic effect on
small entities which is reasonably foreseeable.”130
The analytical requirements of Title II of Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act (UMRA)131 are similar to those in Executive Order 12,866.
They both ask executive branch agencies to “assess the effects of
Federal regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and
the private sector”132 and “select the least costly, most cost-effective or
least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule.”133
But UMRA’s coverage is much more limited than that of the Executive
Order.134 According to a CRS report, 72 percent of the economically
significant rules covered by the Executive Order are not covered by
UMRA. 135 This limited coverage is compounded by the fact that
UMRA’s requirements for analyzing the effects of proposed regulations
are largely informational, and judicial review does not impose
meaningful consequences for noncompliance. A bill introduced in the
113th Congress, H.R. 899, would have provided more detailed criteria
128. Legislation to Improve the Regulatory Flexibility Act Before the H. Comm.
on Small Bus., 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of Thomas Sullivan, Chief
Counsel, Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration).
129. H.R. 2542, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2013].
130. Id. § 2(b)(9)(B).
131. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).
132. 2 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
133. Id. § 1535.
134. See Dudley, Unfunded Mandates, supra note 95, at 17 (“Section 4 of the
Act lists seven exemptions (including, for example, for regulations that
enforce constitutional rights of individuals, provide conditions for federal
assistance, or are necessary for national security). UMRA’s title II
provisions also do not apply to regulations issued by independent agencies, rules for which no proposal was issued, or rules implementing statutes
that prohibit consideration of costs. Further, mandates are defined as
‘direct costs,’ or amounts governmental or private sector entities ‘will be
required to spend in order to comply with the Federal private sector
mandate,’ in contrast to the more encompassing term, ‘effects on the
economy,’ used in Executive Order 12866.”).
135. Robert Jay Dilger & Richard S. Beth, Cong. Research Serv.,
R40957, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History, Impact, and
Issues 27 (2010).
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to federal agencies for assessing unfunded mandates and expanded
consultation, among other things.136 “To make the executive branch
more accountable for the goals of UMRA, Congress could provide OMB
oversight authority beyond certifying and reporting on agencies’
actions.”137
2.

Amendments to the APA

The bicameral Regulatory Accountability Act (RAA),138 first introduced in the 112th Congress, would amend the Administrative
Procedure Act. It was one of the more comprehensive legislative proposals introduced in the 113th Congress and encompassed analytical as
well as procedural changes, codifying and extending some of the
requirements in presidential executive orders. It was reintroduced in
2015.139
The RAA would classify regulations into three categories: “high
impact” rules, with estimated effects of $1 billion or more in a year;
“major” rules, defined (as in the Congressional Review Act) as having
impacts of $100 million or more in a year; and “other” rules.140 It would
also cover guidance documents, which are exempt from APA notice and
comment procedures, and classify them as “major,” and “other.” 141
Depending on their classification, rules and guidance documents would
be subject to procedures beyond the notice and comment procedures
currently embodied in the APA. Some of the key changes are
summarized here:
 High impact and major regulations would begin with an
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), through
which agencies would share and gather information before they
develop an approach to address the identified problem through
proposed rulemaking.142
 High impact regulations would also be subject to a public hearing (akin to more adjudicatory procedures conducted under the
“formal rulemaking” requirements), where rules of evidence
136. Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R.
899, 113th Cong. (2013).
137. Dudley, Unfunded Mandates, supra note 95, at 20.
138. S. 1029, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2122, 113th Cong. (2013).
139. Regulatory Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 185, 114th Cong. (2015)
(passing a House of Representatives vote on January 13, 2015, and
currently referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs in the Senate).
140. S. 1029 § 2.
141. Id.
142. Id. § 3(c).
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apply, and parties may both subpoena and cross-examine
witnesses. Decisions must address each of the findings presented
and be supported by “substantial evidence.”143
 All final rules would include a plan for review at least every ten
years, to “determine whether, based upon evidence, there
remains a need for the rule, whether the rule is in fact achieving
statutory objectives, whether the rule’s benefits continue to
justify its costs, and whether the rule can be modified or
rescinded to reduce costs while continuing to achieve statutory
objectives.”144
 The RAA would require the heads of agencies to certify that
they have complied with the Information Quality Act (IQA),145
which attempts to ensure the “quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity” of information disseminated to the public, and
provides procedures by which affected parties can petition
agencies to correct information that does not meet those
standards.146

As noted in the previous section, the Sound Regulation Act of 2014
would also have amended the APA to include both procedural and
analytical steps when developing regulations.
3.

Subject Significant Guidance Documents to
Regulatory Review and Notice Requirements

Various authorities have raised concerns that agency guidance
practices are sometimes used to circumvent rulemaking procedures and
recommended that they “should be more transparent, consistent and
accountable.”147 To address that concern, the RAA and the Clearing
Unnecessary Regulatory Burdens (CURB) Act148 would have applied
regulatory analysis requirements to guidance documents that have the
effect of regulation.149 CURB would codify OMB’s 2007 Good Guidance
Practices Bulletin to ensure that significant guidance documents are
subject to OIRA regulatory review as well as public notice and
comment requirements. The Closing Regulatory Loopholes Act of
143. Id. § 3(e), § 3(g), § 6.
144. H.R. 2122, 113th Cong. § 3((f)(4)(G)(i) (2013).
145. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-153 (2000) [hereinafter Information
Quality Act].
146. Id. at 2763A-154; S. 1029 § 3(f)(4)(F).
147. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB
Bulletin No. 07-027, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance
Practices (2007).
148. S. 1730, 113th Cong. (2013).
149. Id.
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2013150 would have required congressional approval of guidance documents.151
4.

Incentives to Reexamine Existing Regulations

Most legislative and executive branch reforms have focused on analyzing and improving new regulations, and agencies seldom look back
to evaluate the cumulative effects of regulations or whether existing
regulations are having their intended effects. Section 610 of the RFA
provides for periodic review of regulations for their impact on small
businesses, but researchers have found that most agencies “comply with
the letter of the law for only a small percentage of their rules, and they
rarely take action beyond publishing a brief notice in the Federal
Register.”152 The Regulatory Improvement Act of 2013153 would have
created a legislative commission to recommend regulations for
modification and repeal by Congress.154 Title VI of H.R. 4304 called for
a “periodic review and termination of regulations”155 and would have
relied on sunset provisions and petition procedures to identify rules for
review.
Congress has considered using budgeting concepts to alter regulatory agencies’ incentives to issue new regulations and examine the
effectiveness of existing regulations. 156 In 1980, President Carter’s
Economic Report of the President discussed proposals to “develop a
‘regulatory budget,’ similar to the expenditure budget, as a framework
for looking at the total financial burden imposed by regulations, for
setting some limits to this burden, and for making tradeoffs within
those limits.”157 The Report noted analytical problems with developing
a regulatory budget but concluded that “tools like the regulatory
budget may have to be developed” if governments are to “recognize
150. S. 320, 113th Cong. (2013).
151. Id.
152. Michael R. See, Willful Blindness: Federal Agencies’ Failure to Comply
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s Periodic Review Requirement—And
Current Proposals to Invigorate the Act, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1199,
1200 (2006).
153. S. 1390, 113th Cong. (2013).
154. Id.
155. Jumpstarting Opportunities with Bold Solutions Act, H.R. 4304, 113th
Cong. (2014).
156. See Federal Regulation: A Review of Legislative Proposals Before S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 124
(2011) (statement of Sen. Rob Portman) (noting the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act would require “cost-benefit analysis of economically
significant rules” and require agencies to select the “Least Onerous Alternative”).
157. 1980 Economic Report, supra note 117.
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that regulation to meet social goals competes for scarce resources with
other national objectives,” and set priorities to achieve the “greatest
social benefits.”158
The National Regulatory Budget Act159 would have established an
independent executive office responsible for reporting annually to Congress on the costs of existing regulations and the costs of proposed new
regulations. Congress would use these data to establish binding
regulatory caps for each executive regulatory agency.160
The United Kingdom has adopted a “one-in, two-out” approach to
regulation that shares similarities with a regulatory budget in that
“departments have to remove or modify existing regulation(s) to the
value of £2 of savings for every pound of cost imposed,”161 and members
of the U.S. Senate are considering similar legislation currently under
development.162 A “regulatory paygo” “would require federal agencies
to identify and eliminate one existing regulation for each new regulation
they want to add.”163 Regulatory agencies, with oversight from OIRA
and either the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or the GAO, would
be required to eliminate one outdated or duplicative regulation before
issuing a new regulation of the same approximate economic impact.
Unlike a regulatory budget, agencies would only have to estimate
costs for regulations being introduced (which they should already do)
and offsetting regulations they propose to remove. While still subject
to analytical challenges, a regulatory “paygo” has the potential to impose some needed discipline on regulatory agencies and to generate a
constructive debate on the real impacts of regulations. Focusing on the
costs of regulations and allowing agencies to set priorities and make
tradeoffs among regulatory programs might remove some of the
contentiousness surrounding benefit-cost analysis. Congress would
probably need to establish regulatory burden baselines in new authorizing legislation, unless they expect those costs to be offset with existing
regulations.164
158. Id. at 126 (1980).
159. S. 2153, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. 5184, 113th Cong. (2014).
160. Id.
161. Dep’t for Bus., Innovation & Skills, One-in, Two-out: Statement of New
Regulation, GOV.UK (last updated July 9, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/
government/collections/one-in-two-out-statement-of-new-regulation#
documents.
162. See Federal Regulation: A Review of Legislative Proposals Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 172
(2011) (statement of Sen. Mark R. Warner) (discussing his proposal “to
improve cost accountability for federal regulations”).
163. Mark R. Warner, Red-tape Relief for a Sluggish Recovery, Wash. Post,
Dec. 13, 2010, at A19.
164. See Dudley, Unfunded Mandates, supra note 95, at 21.
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III. Legislative Branch Oversight of Regulation
As noted above, Congress has not taken full advantage of its “‘awesome arsenal’ of weapons” 165 for controlling agencies’ actions. 166
Members do use oversight hearings and occasionally use appropriations
to limit agencies’ ability to develop or enforce regulations,167 but as
Justice Elena Kagan has noted, “the complaint-driven nature of
congressional oversight, especially in combination with its reliance on
committees . . . pushes toward the ad hoc rather than the systematic
consideration of administrative policy.” 168 Recent Congresses have
introduced legislation that would strengthen the legislative branch’s
own ability to control regulation. One approach would require a congressional vote before major new regulations can become effective (the
REINS Act), and another would establish a congressional office to review and evaluate regulations.
A.

The REINS Act169

The Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS)
Act,170 which has been introduced in each of the last three Congresses,
and passed the House of Representatives in the 113th Congress,171 is
designed to “increase accountability for and transparency in the federal
regulatory process.”172 It “is patterned after the 1996 CRA, providing
expedited procedures for evaluating and voting on major regulations,”173
but it would change the default outcome. Rather than requiring
Congress to enact a “joint resolution of disapproval” to prevent a rule
from going into effect, no major rule could go into effect until Congress
enacted an affirmative “joint resolution of approval.”174

165. Wilson, supra note 79, at 236 (quoting Herbert Kaufman, The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs 164 (1981)).
166. Kagan, supra note 5, at 2257–58.
167. Curtis W. Copeland, Cong. Research Serv., RL34354, Congressional Influence on Rulemaking and Regulation Through
Appropriations Restrictions 1–2 (2008).
168. Kagan, supra note 5, at 2260.
169. Although this Article discusses the REINS Act in context of its 113th
Congress introduction, since the writing of the Article, the act has been
introduced to the 114th Congress. Regulations from the Executive in Need
of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, S. 226, H.R. 427, 114th Cong. (2015).
170. H.R. 367, 113th Cong. (2013).
171. It was also introduced in the Senate. S. 15, 113th Cong. (2013).
172. H.R. 367 § 2.
173. Dudley, supra note 86, at 10.
174. H.R. 367 § 802.
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This would be a significant change to the current regulatory procedures and would likely change the incentives and behavior of legislators, regulators, and affected parties in positive and negative ways.175
Opponents argue that current procedures, where Congress delegates
regulatory decision-making to agencies, are “consistent with the
Framers’ intention”176 and provide sufficient regulatory constraint on
executive agencies through (1) authorizing legislation, (2) the APA
public comment process, (3) executive branch review and oversight, (4)
the threat of a resolution of disapproval under the CRA, and (5) judicial
review.177 They also argue that expert agencies are in a better position
to make complex regulatory decisions than political officials.178
Others defend the constitutionality of the Act179 and see it as way
to “force Members to take responsibility for the laws they pass, and to
force Administrations to be accountable for the laws they create
through regulation.”180 Many federal regulations being promulgated today depend on legislation passed decades ago by different congresses
focused on different concerns. The REINS Act would ensure that major
regulations based on authority delegated years ago could only be
adopted with consent from the current Congress.181

175. For a discussion of these incentives, see Dudley, supra note 86.
176. Sidney Shapiro, The REINS Act: The Latest Conservative Plan to Gum
Up the Regulatory Works, CPRBlog (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.
progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=84F5CF0B-E804-F8D17197786456C5DC4F.
177. REINS Act—Promoting Jobs and Expanding Freedom by Reducing
Needless Regulations: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 90–92 (2011) (statement of Sally Katzen).
178. Sidney Shapiro, Ctr. for Progressive Reform, CPR Backgrounder: The REINS Act: The Conservative Push to Undercut
Regulatory Protections for Health, Safety, and the
Environment (2011).
179. Jonathan H. Adler, The Regulations from the Executive in Need of
Scrutiny (REINS) Act, The Federalist Soc’y for Law & Pub.
Policy Studies (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications
/detail/the-regulations-from-the-executive-in-need-of-scrutiny-reins-act;
REINS Act—Promoting Jobs and Expanding Freedom by Reducing
Needless Regulations, supra note 177, at 83–84 (statement of Jonathan H.
Adler, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law and
Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law); id. at 44–
45 (statement of David McIntosh, Member of Congress, retired).
180. Editorial, The Congressional Accountability Act, Wall St. J., Jan. 14,
2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203525404576049
703586223080.
181. Adler, supra note 179.
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B.

Create a Congressional Regulatory Oversight Body

The President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness encouraged
Congress to consider a congressional staff, modeled on the CBO or
GAO, to review agencies’ regulatory analysis and the cumulative effects
of existing regulations.182
The Truth in Regulating Act of 2000183 required the GAO independently to evaluate agencies’ regulatory impact analyses supporting final
regulations, but this requirement was contingent upon the GAO
receiving yearly appropriations of $5,200,000.184 These funds have never
been appropriated.
The Strengthening Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Actions
for Efficiency Act185 would have created an office within the Congressional Budget Office with responsibility for assessing the impact of
federal rules and regulations.
A non-executive branch agency responsible for reviewing regulations would have several benefits.186 Most importantly, it would serve
as an independent check on the analysis and decisions of regulatory
agencies and OMB.187 A 1999 GAO report evaluating OMB’s annual
reports to Congress on the benefits and costs of regulation observed,
It is politically difficult for OMB to provide an independent
assessment and analysis of the administration’s own estimates in
a public report to Congress. If Congress wants an independent
assessment of executive agencies’ regulatory costs and benefits, it
may have to look outside of the executive branch or outside of
the federal government.188

While a congressional office would not have the same authority
OMB exercises to affect agency draft regulations, it would be able to
devote resources to areas OMB cannot, “such as examining the effects
of regulations issued by independent regulatory agencies.”189 “Just as
182. President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness, Roadmap to
Renewal: Invest in Our Future, Build on Our Strengths, Play
to Win 45 (2011).
183. Pub. L. No. 106-312, 114 Stat. 1248–50 (2000).
184. Id. at 1249.
185. S. 1472, 113th Cong. (2013).
186. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, Recommendations for
Improving Regulatory Accountability and Transparency (2003).
187. Id. at 11.
188. GAO, Analysis of OMB’s Reports, supra note 104, at 5.
189. Susan Dudley, Congress Needs Its Own Regulatory Review Office, Penn
Program on Regulation: RegBlog (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.
law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2011/08/congress-needs-its-own-regulatory
-review-office.html.
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the CBO provides independent estimates of the on-budget costs of legislation and federal programs, a congressional regulatory office could
provide Congress and the public independent analysis [regarding] the
likely off-budget effects of” legislation and regulation.190 This would be
particularly important if Congress enacts some of the other procedural
changes being discussed, such as the REINS Act or a regulatory
paygo.191

IV. Judicial Branch Oversight of Regulation
Under the APA, after a regulatory agency issues a final rule, an
affected party may challenge it in court. Reviewing courts may reverse
or remand the rule to the agency for reconsideration on constitutional
grounds, on procedural grounds (whether the agency followed the
procedures specified in the APA), or on the basis of the agency’s
interpretation of the authorizing statute.
A.

Changes to the Standard by Which Courts Review Regulations

The courts review regulations issued through informal rulemaking
procedures under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review,192
while regulations issued under formal rulemaking procedures are subject
to a “substantial evidence” standard. 193 The substantial evidence
standard directs a reviewing court to set aside an agency action unless
the record provides “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”194 It is arguably a
more exacting standard than “arbitrary and capricious,” which grants
considerable deference to agency expertise. Substituting a substantial
evidence test could motivate agencies to develop and provide better
scientific and technical data and analysis in support of regulations.195
Some argue that the substantial evidence test used as part of an
informal (or even hybrid) regulatory proceeding would differ very little
from an arbitrary and capricious test, however. 196 The RAA would
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
193. Id. § 706(2)(E).
194. Mareno v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8575, at *6–7 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 8,
1999) (describing the evidence standard as “more than a scintilla but less
than a preponderance”).
195. Eve E. Bachrach, The Case for a Substantial Evidence Amendment to the
Informal Rulemaking Provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 293, 297–99 (2000); Is Reform Needed, supra
note 24 (statement by Howard Coble).
196. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“In review of rules of
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subject major and high impact final regulations to the substantial
evidence standard of review.197
B.

Judicial Review of Regulatory Impact Analysis

Presidential executive orders governing regulatory impact analysis
have stated that their requirements are not enforceable by law198; however, several bills introduced in the 113th Congress would change
that.199 “Judicial review could be valuable—not because the courts have
a particular expertise in regulatory analysis but because agencies tend
to take more seriously aspects of their mission that are subject to
litigation. Like executive and congressional oversight, judicial oversight
would likely make regulatory agencies more accountable for better
decisions based on better analysis.”200
Courts have overturned several regulations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission as being arbitrary and capricious and in
violation of the APA, finding that compliance with the Commission’s
statutory criteria demanded a more rigorous analysis of benefits and
costs to evaluate the “rule’s effects on efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.”201

general applicability made after ‘notice and comment’ rule-making,
[substantial evidence and arbitrary or capricious] criteria converge into a
test of reasonableness.”); Matthew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the
Substantial Evidence and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review
During Informal Rulemaking, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 541 (1986).
197. H.R. 2122, 113th Cong. § 6 (2013) [hereinafter Regulatory Accountability
Act].
198. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (“Judicial Review. Nothing in this Executive order shall affect any otherwise available judicial
review of agency action. This Executive order is intended only to improve
the internal management of the Federal Government and does not create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or
equity by a party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.”).
199. For a summary of bills, see Status of Regulatory Reform Legislation, 113th
Congress, Reg. Studies Ctr., http://regulatorystudies.columbian.
gwu.edu/status-regulatory-reform-legislation-113th-congress (last visited
Mar. 23, 2015).
200. Susan Dudley, George Wash. Univ. Reg. Studies Ctr., Prepared
Statement of Susan E. Dudley, Hearing on Federal Regulation:
A Review of Legislative Proposals, Part II, at 17 (2011).
201. For a discussion of recent cases, see Jane C. Luxton, An Uncomfortable
Wake-Up Call for Dodd-Frank Regulators, Client Alert (Pepper
Hamilton, LLP, Berwyn, Pa.), available at http://www.pepperlaw.com
/pdfs/ClientAlert021012.pdf.
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C.

Judicial Review of Statutory Requirements

Congress has considered legislative amendments that would provide
for judicial review of statutory requirements, such as those encompassed
in the Information Quality Act,202 the Regulatory Flexibility Act,203 and
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.204 For example, the IQA does not
explicitly provide for judicial review of agency denials of requests for
correction, and to date, courts have chosen not to try cases that have
been brought.205 The RAA would have required the heads of agencies
to certify that they have complied with the IQA and subject compliance
with the IQA to judicial review.206 Responding to concerns noted above,
the Regulatory Flexibility Improvement Act would have provided for
judicial review of final agency actions.207
Congress also considered legislation (such as H.R. 899) 208 that
would make compliance with UMRA requirements judicially reviewable
under the APA, so that an agency’s failure to justify not selecting the
“least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative that
achieves the objectives of the rule” 209 could be grounds for staying,
enjoining, invalidating, or otherwise affecting such agency rule.

Conclusion
All three branches of government have responsibility under the
Constitution for ensuring accountable regulation by providing checks
and balances against each other. Over the last century, they have
experimented with approaches to improving the outcomes of administrative laws by controlling the procedures and principles by which
regulations are generated. With concern over regulatory impacts rising,
proposals for regulatory reform are gaining traction in the executive,
legislative, and judiciary branches of government. The 114th Congress
is likely to consider legislation to reform the procedures by which
202. Information Quality Act, supra note 145, at 2763A-153–154.
203. Regulatory Flexibility Act, supra note 49, at 1169–70.
204. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48,
70–71 (1995).
205. For different perspectives on this issue, see James W. Conrad Jr., The
Information Quality Act—Antiregulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions?,
12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 521, 538 (2003); Sidney A. Shapiro, Rena
Steinzor & Margaret Clune, Ossifying Ossification: Why the
Information Quality Act Should Not Provide for Judicial
Review 1, 9 (2006).
206. Regulatory Accountability Act, supra note 197.
207. Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2013, supra note 129.
208. Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2013, supra
note 136.
209. 2 U.S.C. § 1535 (2012).
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regulations are issued, clarify the decision criteria agencies use to
develop regulations, and take responsibility for the content of individual
regulations promulgated pursuant to statutes. While none of the major
regulatory reform legislation considered by the 113th Congress passed,
the bills considered there may have laid the groundwork for reforms in
2015. Like the bipartisan, inter-branch regulatory reform efforts of the
1970s and 1980s, which brought about unexpected innovation, higher
quality and lower prices in previously regulated industries, reforms
today could spur economic growth and improve the welfare of American
families, workers, and entrepreneurs.
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